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The Fourth Industrial Revolution has profoundly changed the way of doing business
during the last decade. In the process, new technologies, such as mobile internet, big
data, artificial intelligence, and machine learning have become increasingly important for
today’s economy. Existing research has shown that in times of deep technological change
regional economic prosperity depends strongly on the dynamic development of entrepre-
neurial activities, with the entrepreneur as the driving agent (Florida, 2003; Malecki, 1997).
Consequently, attracting potential entrepreneurs and supporting growth-oriented entrepre-
neurship have become key concerns of regional economic policy.
London is one of the world’s most dynamic entrepreneurial cities. Its success has been
driven by highly educated entrepreneurial individuals from all over the world who choose
London to start and expand high value-added, technologically dynamic businesses. London
has been able to attract domestic and foreign talent due to numerous characteristics, includ-
ing a relatively liberal and diverse population, a dynamic job market and an advantageous
regulatory framework (Nathan and Vandore, 2014). One of the biggest, if not the biggest,
success stories of London’s entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE) in the last decade is the devel-
opment of London into one of the world’s leading financial technology (FinTech) hubs,
hosting 25 of Europe’s 50 most successful FinTech companies (FinTechCity, 2018).
However, London’s leading position cannot be taken for granted, as FinTech is a relatively
young industry and London competes in this area with other FinTech hubs, including New
York, Silicon Valley and Singapore (Ernst and Young, 2016).
The result of the EU referendum held on 23 June 2016 unleashed a series of develop-
ments, referred to as ‘Brexit’ for short, including the UK’s formal withdrawal from the
European Union (EU) on 31 January 2020 and the end of the transition period currently
agreed for 31 December 2020. This process is redefining the UK’s relationship with the rest
of Europe and the world at large. It is a process characterized by a high level of uncertainty
regarding its outcomes, which can impede the strategic decisions of economic actors and, as
a consequence, influence the development of the EE in the UK, including London.
Although the EE concept has attracted increasing attention in policy circles (Mason and
Brown, 2014), it has also raised concerns due to a lack of conceptual rigour and a clear
analytical framework (Stam, 2015). In this regard, Alvedalen and Boschma (2017) identify
several shortcomings of the EE concept, such as a lack of focus on the importance of and
connections between different entrepreneurial actors; the evolution of these connections in
times of institutional change; and references to the network literature concerning the relative
importance of non-local versus local linkages, egocentric networks, diversity and connec-
tivity. So far, empirical studies have mainly highlighted the key components of numerous
successful EEs (e.g. Isenberg, 2011; Klingler-Vidra et al., 2016; Spigel, 2016). In order to
understand the dynamics of EEs, however, it is essential to go beyond success stories
(Auerswald, 2015). In order to address these gaps in the literature, we regard EEs as com-
plex adaptive systems in which micro-level activities are shaped by macro-level patterns
(Martin and Sunley, 2007), while macro-level structures evolve as a consequence of the
behaviours of the actors involved and the interactions among them (Pavard and Dugdale,
2006). Therefore, we do not only focus on the key components (actors) of London’s EE, but
also on the interdependencies between them (Eisenhard and Piezunka, 2011). In this regard,
we consider studying the impact of Brexit on London’s FinTech industry an important case
investigating how entrepreneurial actors with different firm characteristics and egocentric
network structures (Stuart and Sorenson, 2005) react to uncertainty and disruption caused
by institutional and political change. Discussing the potential effects of such actor-level
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responses on the diversity of and the connectivity among actors of London’s EE allows us to
draw inferences about its resilience (Boschma, 2015; Martin and Sunley, 2007; Pike et al.,
2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the
conceptual framework, while the third section explains the case study design and method-
ology. The fourth section presents and discusses empirical results, with the final section
drawing conclusions and implications.
Theoretical background
Entrepreneurship is a complex concept that can be studied using different approaches. In the
creation-based approach, entrepreneurship is simply defined as the start-up of a new venture
(Gartner and Carter, 2003), while in the innovation-based approach, entrepreneurship is
understood as the innovative creation of new products or new ways of doing business
(Schumpeter, 1934). Entrepreneurship is practised by entrepreneurs who are individuals
exhibiting innovative capabilities that allow them to explore ‘opportunities to discover
and evaluate new goods and services and exploit them’ (Stam and Spigel, 2017: 1). Here,
three different types of entrepreneurs can be distinguished: potential entrepreneurs, early-
stage entrepreneurs and owner-managers of established businesses, typically defined as those
older than 3.5 years (Singer et al., 2015). Potential entrepreneurs are defined as individuals
who have personal characteristics that allow them to start a new venture, such as risk-taking
propensity and proactivity (Krueger and Brazeal, 1994). Early-stage entrepreneurs include
nascent entrepreneurs, who are actively engaged in creating a new business (Wagner, 2004),
as well as owner-managers who run a start-up younger than 3.5 years (Singer et al., 2015).
While during its early stage the entrepreneurial process is a sequence of actions associated
with identifying and evaluating perceived opportunities and accumulating resources
necessary for the successful formation of a new venture (Cooney, 2005), the process of
entrepreneurship becomes a cyclical progression of opportunity-targeting and strategic
decision-making concerning the allocation of scarce resources once the business is estab-
lished (Glancey, 1998). In this regard, the entrepreneurial process is not only based on the
innovation capacity of the founder and/or manager but is also linked to entrepreneurial
employees who develop new activities, such as new goods or services, or set up new business
units within their company (Cooney, 2005).
Entrepreneurial ecosystems and evolutionary economic geography
Initially promoted by Isenberg (2011) in the business management literature, the EE concept
incorporates several themes from earlier literature on entrepreneurship, clusters and inno-
vation systems. While entrepreneurship research focuses on the characteristics and functions
of entrepreneurs, cluster research focuses on the general geographic concentration of inter-
connected companies and institutions in a specific place (e.g. Gordon and McCann, 2000;
Martin and Sunley, 2003; Porter, 1998), whereas research on innovation systems analyses
the contribution of different agents in the generation and diffusion of knowledge and inno-
vation at different spatial levels (e.g. Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Cooke, 2002; Cooke et al.,
1997; Freeman, 2004; Fritsch, 2001). Although some aspects discussed in the literature on
clusters and innovation systems help to understand why some places are persistently more
entrepreneurial than others, the links in the entrepreneurship literature remain implicit (Acs
et al., 2014). The EE concept combines these different strands of literature by explicitly
focusing on the unique needs of start-ups and innovative high-growth companies, as well as
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the place-specific components and interactions required (Mason and Brown, 2014). EEs can
be defined as ‘a set of interconnected entrepreneurial actors (both potential and existing),
entrepreneurial organizations (e.g. firms, venture capitalists (VCs), business angels, banks),
institutions (universities, public sector agencies, financial bodies), and entrepreneurial pro-
cesses (e.g. the business birth rate, number of high growth firms, number of social entre-
preneurs (. . .)) which formally and informally coalesce’ (Mason and Brown, 2014: 5) in a
way that creates and maintains a dynamic, cumulative local process of entrepreneurship.
From a theoretical perspective, the EE concept is also strongly linked to evolutionary
economic geography (e.g. Martin and Sunley, 2007; Pavard and Dugdale, 2006; Pendal
et al., 2009), which regards economic ecosystems as complex adaptive systems, in which
macro-level structures evolve as a consequence of the behaviour of the actors involved and
the interactions among them (Pavard and Dugdale, 2006). At the same time, micro-level
activities are shaped by macro-level patterns (Martin and Sunley, 2007). Consequently,
disturbances arising from shifting external and internal conditions can impact the evolution
of an economic ecosystem (Cadenasso et al., 2006). Typically, economic ecosystems evolve
slowly over time (Stam, 2010). However, they can also change abruptly due to fundamental
events (Pendal et al., 2009). As economic ecosystems are non-linear self-organizing systems,
fundamental events can change the characteristics of an economic system in an unpredict-
able and irreversible way (Martin and Sunley, 2007; Pavard and Dugdale, 2006). Due to
path-dependency, there is the risk that such changes become embedded in the economic
system and hamper its future evolution (Levin, 1998). In contrast, the capacity of an eco-
nomic ecosystem to resist, recover from, reorganize and renew in the face of fundamental
events is defined as resilience (e.g. Boschma, 2015; Hassink, 2010; Simmie and Martin,
2010).
The resilience of an economic ecosystem is strongly linked to certain network features,
such as diversity and connectivity (Martin and Sunley, 2007; Pike et al., 2010). According to
Metcalfe (2005), the entrepreneurial diversity of an economic ecosystem, which is defined as
the degree to which an economic ecosystem contains a broad variety of entrepreneurial
agents (entrepreneurs, mentors, talents, investors) and venture types (size, age, business
model), is seen as a critical factor. Moreover, the connectivity of an economic ecosystem,
which concerns the connections between elements in an EE, is seen as another critical factor.
Following Spigel and Harrison (2017), resilient EEs are characterized by high entrepreneur-
ial diversity. Therefore, their ability to attract external actors, while preventing their loss
through outmigration or failure, is crucial for the resilience of the EE. In addition, resilient
EEs are also characterized by actors’ ability to create and maintain internal and external
ties, which increases actor connectivity and, consequently, fosters knowledge exchange and
the recycling of resources (Boschma, 2015). In contrast, weakened EEs are characterized by
the loss of actor connectivity, a decline in the inflow of entrepreneurial actors, increasing
outmigration of entrepreneurial actors and business failure (Spigel and Harrison, 2017).
While entrepreneurs are regarded as the core actors in building and sustaining the EE
(Acs et al., 2014), they are complemented by other actors with whom they are connected
directly and indirectly through customer–supplier relationships and strategic alliances,
forming their egocentric networks (Stuart and Sorenson, 2005). Egocentric networks con-
cern the functions and compositions of network ties around a specific actor and thereby help
to explain how firms’ patterns of interaction provide access to different types of resources
and shape actor-level outcomes, such as strategic responses (Provan et al., 2007). According
to Isenberg (2011), the actors of an EE can be divided into six domains: policy, finance,
culture, support, human capital, and markets. The domain of markets covers the availability
of sophisticated customers, who are willing to experiment and adapt to new products and
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services, as well as access to international markets (Isenberg, 2011). A systematic decrease in
their demand can lead to a shrinking market size and weaken the EE (Martin et al., 2019).
Finance involves access to funding, such as bank loans, angel investors and venture capital,
as well as related financial services (Isenberg, 2011). While access to loans is seen as being
more important in the start-up phase, venture capital is considered more important for
scaling up (Motoyama et al., 2013). Without sufficient access to loans and venture capital,
the EE is likely to stagnate or decline (Feldman et al., 2005). The domain of policy involves
the availability of public sector advocates who are willing to promote entrepreneurship,
as well as the government’s provision of legal and regulatory frameworks for entrepreneurial
activity (Isenberg, 2011). The domain of support covers the availability of non-
governmental institutions, such as entrepreneurship associations; support professionals,
such as legal, accounting and technical experts; and infrastructure, such as internet and
transport (Isenberg, 2011). Human capital concerns the availability of experienced entre-
preneurs who can act as mentors and serial entrepreneurs (Feldman, 2001), skilled labour
and higher education institutions, such as universities (Isenberg, 2011). Following Menefee
et al. (2006), it can be assumed that access to human capital positively affects business
performance. Moreover, a culturally heterogeneous labour force is seen as beneficial, as it
expands the local variety of ideas, knowledge and skills (Rodrıguez-Pose and Hardy, 2015).
Finally, the domain of culture concerns the attitude towards entrepreneurship and involves
the visibility of success stories, international reputation and societal norms, such as toler-
ance of risk, mistakes and failures; creativity and experimentation; and the social status of
entrepreneurs in society (Isenberg, 2011). A positive attitude towards entrepreneurship is
assumed to increase the willingness of potential entrepreneurs to take the risk associated
with innovative entrepreneurship (Fritsch and Storey, 2014).
In the EE literature, there is an ongoing debate on the role of anchor firms (e.g. Feldman
et al., 2005; Johns, 2016), which are large established firms with significant capital endow-
ment, as well as technological and organizational skills. They are considered key players in
all domains of EEs due to their ability to attract international talent, produce spin-offs,
provide business infrastructure and act as customers and investors (Feldman et al., 2005). In
addition, anchor firms act as brokers (Morrison, 2008), linking local EEs with international
markets and global knowledge networks (Johns, 2016). Due to direct and indirect connec-
tions, start-ups and innovative high-growth firms develop in co-evolution with anchor firms
(Johns, 2016). Hence, it can be assumed that changes in the operations and strategies of
anchor firms have a potential impact on entrepreneurial actors interlinked with them.
Conceptual framework
The concepts presented above form the foundations for the conceptual framework used to
analyse the effects of Brexit on the EE of London’s FinTech industry (Figure 1). We see the
time since the EU referendum as a period of high political uncertainty and Brexit as a
process of institutional change. We are particularly interested in analysing how different
entrepreneurial actors respond to political uncertainty and changing institutional settings,
and how these actor-level responses might affect the resilience of London’s FinTech EE.
We follow Isenberg (2011) by grouping the key actors under consideration into the
domains of markets, finance, human capital, policy and support, and consider how each
domain has been affected by the decision of the UK to leave the EU. Compared to Isenberg
(2011), we regard the domain of culture as a more general feature of the EE rather than a
group of actors. As Brexit is likely to modify the flow of labour, goods, capital and services
between the UK and the EU, we expect the domains of human capital, finance and markets
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to be affected (e.g. D€orry, 2017; Hall and Wojcik, 2018; Pollard, 2018; Ringe, 2018).
However, the UK government has the potential to influence the domains of policy and
support, such as by changing the country’s regulatory, legal and tax frameworks, and by
offering support infrastructure to the industry to counteract the negative effects of leaving
the EU. Overall, the domain of culture may be affected by a perceived decrease in the
acceptance of foreigners and the contribution of their entrepreneurship to British society
(Fritsch and Storey, 2014).
Following the operational definitions of Singer et al. (2015), we are interested in the
responses of actors at different stages of the entrepreneurial process to the political uncer-
tainty and the prospect of changing institutional settings related to Brexit. From an EE
perspective, the capacity of political uncertainty and institutional changes to trigger actor-
level responses of nascent entrepreneurs and start-ups are of particular interest (Stam, 2007),
as entrepreneurial actors that are new to the EE play a specific role in its evolution
(Metcalfe, 2005). Strategic decisions of owner-managers of established high-growth busi-
nesses are also considered significant, as their relocation would negatively affect the evolu-
tion of the EE, particularly in times when start-up activities tend to be postponed and
cancelled (Stam, 2007).
Following Liesch et al., (2014), we assume the strategic responses of entrepreneurial actors
to be triggered by their exposure to and ability to cope with political uncertainty. Therefore, we
consider EEs as consisting of a variety of actors who respond to uncertainty and institutional
change in different ways. Hence, we focus on how actor-level responses differ based on com-
panies’ characteristics, such as size, age, degree of internationalization, integration in complex
value chains and accumulated sunk costs (Clark and Wrigley, 1997; Hill et al., 2019; Stam,
2007), as well as on the structure of their egocentric networks (Stuart and Sorenson, 2005). In
this regard, we consider anchor firms to play an important role in firms’ egocentric networks
and in the EE as a whole (D€orry, 2017; Johns, 2016; Svensson et al., 2019).
Following Spigel and Harrison (2017), we assume that the resilience of an economic
ecosystem is strongly linked to the diversity of and the connectivity among its agents.
Therefore, we focus our analysis on the ability of London’s FinTech industry to attract
entrepreneurial actors from outside the EE, while preventing the loss of entrepreneurial
actors through relocation. Moreover, we focus on the ability of London’s FinTech industry
to maintain high connectivity among its actors.
Case study design and methodology
FinTech is recognized as one of the most important and dynamically evolving innovations,
promising to reshape the financial industries profoundly. This process does not only lead to
the creation of new products, services and business models, but also to profound changes in
the financial services value chain (Lee and Shin, 2018). Following Hendrikse et al. (2018), we
define FinTechs as organizations expediting the digital transformation of financial services
by combining innovative business models and new technologies. As a hybrid industry,
FinTech encompasses a variety of different business models, combining financial services
with modern technologies (Dorfleitner et al., 2017). In this regard, some FinTech companies
focus on offering new financial products and services, such as new payment solutions,
automated wealth management, peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding, real-time capital
market engagement and customized insurances (Lee and Shin, 2018), while others focus
on the technological building blocks that facilitate the delivery of new financial products and
services, such as big data, artificial intelligence, blockchain, cybersecurity and cloud banking
(Gozman et al., 2018). Both sides of the industry are strongly interlinked through business-
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to-business (B2B) supplier–customer relationships. Over the last years, traditional financial
institutions have reacted to the rise of FinTech by investing in the development of in-house
FinTech solutions as well as by cooperating with FinTech companies in order to get access
to new technology (Gozman et al., 2018). As a result, part of the FinTech industry has
evolved in close collaboration with financial incumbents, upon which it relies for access to
payment infrastructure, banking licences and know-how (Svensson et al., 2019).
With 61,000 employees, annual revenues of £6.6b and £524m of investment in 2016, the
UK is one of the world’s leaders in FinTech, alongside the USA and China, and an undis-
puted leader in Europe (Ernst and Young, 2016). InnovateFinance (2017) identified 1600
FinTech companies in the UK, most of which are concentrated in London. With an average
business age of 5.3 years and a median headcount of fewer than 50 employees, the UK’s
FinTech industry can be described as relatively young and dominated by small and medium-
sized companies. The majority of the UK’s FinTech businesses concentrate on payments
and remittances (13.5%), lending (13.1%), financial software (10.2%), online investment
(8.2%), big data analytics (6.9%) and RegTech (regulatory technology; 6.9%), with small
and medium-sized enterprises, as well as financial institutions, as their main customers.
Nearly half of the UK’s FinTech businesses are governed by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) and/or the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).
The peak years in the short history of the UK’s FinTech industry fell between 2014 and
2016. Overall, 54% of FinTech start-ups were created in this three-year period
(InnovateFinance, 2017). Existing reports highlight several features of the UK’s EE condu-
cive to FinTech development, including access to highly qualified labour, availability of
early-stage capital, a supportive regulatory regime, robust demand driven by a large con-
sumer market open to innovation, and a financial services industry of global importance
(Ernst and Young, 2016). However, at the same time reports stress that global competition
in FinTech, particularly from the USA and China, has the potential to threaten the UK’s
position (Ernst and Young, 2016).
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for studying the impacts of Brexit on London’s entrepreneurial
ecosystem.
Source: Own illustration based on Isenberg (2011) and Singer et al. (2015).
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To study the effects of Brexit on the UK’s FinTech industry, we focus on London as it
hosts the majority of the UK’s FinTech businesses – 80% of the UK-headquartered FinTech
firms and 98% of the internationally headquartered FinTech firms operating in the UK
(InnovateFinance, 2017). In addition, London is well known for being Europe’s capital of
innovation-based entrepreneurship (Nathan and Vandore, 2014) and remains one of the
world’s leading financial centres (Cassis and Wojcik, 2018).
Methodology
Our secondary data analysis is based on online articles published by the news webpage
FNLondon.com (FNL) from January 2016 to May 2018. FNL is updated daily and supple-
ments the weekly newspaper Financial News. The Financial News, established in 1996 and
focusing exclusively on finance, is recognized as the voice of the City of London. To narrow
down the analysis, we downloaded 750 articles that cover the FinTech industry. These
articles were analysed using the text-analysis software NVivo. In a first step, we selected
113 articles that mention the term Brexit, representing 15% of all articles published about
FinTech. In a second step, we coded the Brexit articles based on the themes derived from our
conceptual framework to calculate their relative coverage.
Our primary data analysis is based on the recording of two panel discussions and 13
in-depth semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted in 2017–2019 in London.
The interview partners were chosen in a manner that ensures the interviews cover actors
from different domains of the EE, such as angel investors (I), banks (B), legal advisers (A),
support organizations (S) and private FinTech companies (C) (Table 1). The interview
partners were approached by email and during industry events, such as London FinTech
Week. In total, we interviewed 9 FinTech companies, of which 56% were start-ups at the
time of the EU referendum (younger than 3.5 years), and additional 44% founded after
June 2016. We are confident that these companies were able to assess the effects Brexit has
had on FinTech start-ups, based on their own experiences. Due to their young age, we also
assume that these companies could assess the effects Brexit has had on nascent entrepre-
neurs. Moreover, we believe that other interview partners – such as the support/lobby
organizations, banks and angel investors – were able to provide valuable insights into the
start-up scene, as they work closely with nascent entrepreneurs and start-ups. In addition,
we are confident that the diverse structure of our interview samples allowed us to capture
some of the developments in the broader ecosystem. All interviews were recorded and
manually transcribed. The transcripts were coded according to the analytical framework
and analysed using NVivo.
Though limited in scope, this qualitative approach allowed us to develop an understand-
ing of the multifaceted, temporally unfolding motivations, opinions and perspectives of
different actors of London’s FinTech industry in the context of Brexit, as well as of the
evolving industry narratives. We consider these personal opinions and industry narratives to
be important, as in times of high uncertainty entrepreneurial actors are constrained in
making informed decisions and rely on their personal opinions when making strategic
choices (Cyert and March, 1992; Machado-da-Silva and Fonseca, 1999). Hence, although
personal opinions and industry narratives per se are not sufficient to accurately predict the
impact of Brexit, they can be seen as influencing the strategic decision-making process and
behaviour of entrepreneurial actors and, consequently, as impacting the development of the
EE as a whole.
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Empirical results
The following sections present our empirical results, closely following the conceptual frame-
work presented in the theoretical background section. The first subsection here highlights
the impact of Brexit on different domains of the EE, while the second focuses on actual and
planned (re)location decisions of different actors along the entrepreneurial process. All
direct quotations used in this section refer to the individual interview transcripts (see
Table 1).
The impact of Brexit on different domains of London’s entrepreneurial ecosystem
In the domain of human capital, the success of London’s FinTech ecosystem has been
based on a strong pool of labour with a high level of financial skills: ‘You find the biggest
pool of financial services talent in the world, only comparable to New York’ (C7, page 4,
rows 12–13). It should, however, be stressed that particularly in the area of technology skills
and entrepreneurship, this pool of labour depends largely on attracting and retaining foreign
talent. In this regard, London’s FinTech ecosystem benefits strongly from its co-location
with incumbent technology firms that offer a pool of international technological talent and
potential entrepreneurs: ‘I think that the UK Tech economy is fuelled by the bigger Tech
Table 1. List of interviews.
Interview
code Description Date
Al London-based multinational law firm July 2017
B1 London-based multinational bank September 2018
Cl Frankfurt-based FinTech company (payments), founded
in 2016
July 2017
C2 Paris-based FinTech company (big data), founded in 2014 July 2017
C3 San-Francisco based multinational FinTech company
(payments), founded in 2015
July 2017
C4 London-based FinTech company (blockchain), founded
in 2018
May 2019
C5 London-based FinTech company (business payments),
founded in 2014
May 2019
C6 London-based FinTech company (consumer lending),
founded in 2016
May 2019
C7 London-based FinTech company (SME lending), founded
in 2012
July 2019
C8 Berlin-based multinational FinTech company (business pay-
ments), founded in 2014
July 2019
C9 London-based FinTech company (business payments),
founded in 2017
July 2019
I1 London-based FinTech-specific venture capital investor July 2017
I2 London-based multinational investment company July 2017
S1 Finnish–British Chamber of Commerce and Industry May 2017
S2 German–British Chamber of Commerce and Industry May 2017
S3 Polish–British Chamber of Commerce and Industry May 2017
S4 Lobby organization of the UK’s FinTech industry July 2017
S5 Lobby organization of the UK’s financial services industry July 2017
Source: Own illustration. Product classification based on Lee and Shin (2018).
Sohns and Wojcik 1547
companies having offices in London and that talent being able then to move into the start-
ups’ (C3, page 5, rows 33–41). This finding confirms the previous work of Johns (2016),
highlighting the importance of anchor firms as brokers (Morrison, 2008) who link start-ups
with the global labour market. Moreover, London’s FinTech ecosystem benefits from free
movement of labour within the EU, as it allows firms to hire European talent without going
through lengthy visa applications: ‘There’s huge talent here. . ., as people can easily move
here’ (C6, page 1, row 42). Hence, it does not come as a surprise that many FinTech
companies are founded and staffed by non-British citizens: ‘Most of our team is not
English’ (C6, page 2, row 19); ‘40% of the founders in FinTech here are not British’ (C8,
page 2, rows 8–9), highlighting the significance of access to the European labour market.
Consequently, problems with attracting, recruiting and retaining tech talent are a major
concern in light of Brexit, and are mentioned in 26.6% of the FNL articles under consid-
eration. One concern is that the complicated and cumbersome visa system currently used for
prospective non-EU employees might be used for potential European employees in the
future: ‘If any of you ever had to fill out a visa form to bring in someone from America
or Australia into a business, you realize . . . it’s not exactly the most flexible arrangement’
(S5, page 2, rows 6–10). In addition, it has been observed by the interview partners that
‘foreign talents are less ready to come to London due to the uncertainties’ (C9, page 7, rows
2–3). As a consequence, competition has increased noticeably: ‘Everybody is fighting for the
same employees’ (C8, page 2, row 33). This problem is more acute for early-stage than for
established FinTech companies, as the former often lack financial resources to go through
extensive visa applications and pay high salaries. These findings suggest that political uncer-
tainty and institutional change can potentially weaken companies’ ability to establish and
maintain links with talented employees. In this regard, a company’s size/age increases its
ability to establish and maintain links with talented employees. As access to talent affects
business success (Menefee et al., 2006), this finding suggests a positive relationship between a
company’s size and its ability to cope with political uncertainty and institutional change.
The ability to attract international entrepreneurs and international talent is also strongly
related to the domain of culture. For many years, London had been seen as a top location
for global talent to work and start businesses due to its reputation as a liberal, tolerant,
and diverse city. Since the EU referendum, the UK has been seen as losing some of this
good reputation: ‘It makes it less attractive, if you have the feeling not to be welcome’ (C1,
page 1, rows 1–4). This finding illustrates the sensitivity of international talents to uncer-
tainty and cultural change, which has the potential to reduce the variety of ideas, knowledge
and skills in the EE (Rodrıguez-Pose and Hardy, 2015) and, consequently, can negatively
affect its diversity.
Considering the domain of finance, London’s FinTech ecosystem has benefited from a
relatively strong supply of capital for early-stage companies based on an active angel inves-
tor network and government support, such as the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme.
However, there has also been a significant dependence on overseas investments and the
European Investment Fund (EIF). In this regard, the venture capital scene in London is
seen as ‘a little bit less evolved than in California, but still much bigger than anywhere else in
the world’ (C6, page 1, rows 40–41). This confirms the value of active angel investor net-
works and access to international venture capital markets for the success of EEs (Feldman
et al., 2005). Consequently, difficulty in attracting investment is seen as another important
concern of London’s FinTech industry in the context of Brexit, mentioned in 19.5% of the
FN articles under consideration. Since the EU referendum, the EIF has reduced its funding
for UK tech companies and invested only in funds that have a European focus. This, in
combination with high uncertainty regarding the future economic development in the UK,
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has led to a situation in which a number of VCs struggled to raise sufficient capital: ‘EIF has
stopped investments in the UK . . .You can also see that a number of VCs who are looking
to raise second funds have failed in doing so or have reduced the size of these funds’ (I1,
page 5, rows 15–17). Although the overall amount of venture capital recovered in 2017,
some younger FinTech companies still struggle with raising funding: ‘When you have 100
investors and normally 40 would say “yeah let’s do it”, now maybe 20 will’ (C6, page 4, rows
14–15). In contrast, more established FinTech companies seem to face fewer problems: ‘The
VC firms that were active here, continue to remain active here. So no, I haven’t really seen a
big difference’ (C5, page 2, rows 25–26); ‘It doesn’t seem to concern our investors’ (C7, page
4, row 36).
These results suggest that uncertainty associated with political change can weaken some
companies’ ability to establish and maintain links to international venture capital markets.
In addition, they highlight that the greater risk-aversion of global investors in times of
political uncertainty disadvantages early-stage more than established companies. As
access to venture capital is crucial for business success (Motoyama et al., 2013), this finding
suggests a negative relationship between a company’s size/age and its exposure to political
uncertainty and institutional change. While venture capital is more important for high-
growth start-ups in order to scale up, access to loans is more important for nascent entre-
preneurs. In this regard, the founder of a recently launched FinTech start-up reported
having difficulties accessing banking infrastructure and funding: ‘the banks . . .were very
sceptical’ (C5, page 2, rows 36–37). In such situations, nascent entrepreneurs and young
start-ups might decide to use alternative funding sources provided by peer-to-peer lending
FinTech companies: ‘Small businesses come to us and we route them to a wide range of
lenders. We solve a recognized problem of the market, which is that when small businesses
cannot get a loan from the bank, they really struggle to find the right alternative’ (C7, page
1, rows 25–32). However, as a response to the current Brexit uncertainties, these FinTech
companies develop tighter lending criteria: ‘We have to be more careful who we lend money
to and how we originated our loans’ (C8, page 3, rows 1–4). This is seen as having a negative
impact on access to funding for start-ups. This finding illustrates the interconnected nature
of London’s FinTech industry and highlights the importance of ties among companies of
different ages and venture types (Metcalfe, 2005). Interestingly, it suggests that uncertainty
associated with political change has the potential to weaken such ties and/or prevent them
from evolving, potentially reducing the connectivity of the ecosystem.
When it comes to the domain of markets, London’s FinTech ecosystem has benefited from
strong domestic demand driven by the needs of incumbent financial services firms and a
national consumer base characterized by good digital skills and willingness to adopt new
technologies relatively quickly. Therefore, shrinking local demand, triggered by an economic
slowdown that is expected to follow Brexit, is an important concern of the industry: ‘It will
certainly have an impact in terms of . . . the size of the market that people are after, which is
already limited within the UK’ (I2, page 3, rows 14–18). Since the EU referendum, growth in
the UK has already slowed down, while inflation has increased. In combination with per-
sistent uncertainties, this situation has already had a negative impact on FinTechs as existing
start-ups postpone big investments: ‘From our customers’ perspective . . . there is a new level
of cautious conservatism’ (C7 page 4, rows 27–28); ‘SMEs have difficulties sensing and
knowing what the future will be. As a consequence . . . [they] postpone big investment’
(C8, page 2, rows 22–24). In contrast, Brexit is seen as offering opportunities for consumer
lending FinTechs, as it is assumed to increase the demand for consumer credit: ‘Our business
is very focused on the UK. So, in a sad sense, it’s a good thing for this business . . . because
more people, when the economy deteriorates, have a demand for credit’ (C6, page 2, rows
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15–18). These findings illustrate the importance of internal consumer–supplier relationships
among diverse types of FinTech firms, including start-up, high-growth and incumbent com-
panies (Metcalfe, 2005). The results also suggest that these B2B links are likely to be weak-
ened by the political uncertainty and institutional changes associated with Brexit. However,
our results also indicate that some companies, depending on their business model, might be
able to establish new B2C (business-to-consumer) relationships. While the former has the
potential to weaken the connectivity of the ecosystem, the latter has the potential to
strengthen its connectivity.
London’s FinTech ecosystem has benefited from its access to the European Single Market,
providing a gateway to a wider customer base. This market access is based on the harmo-
nization of financial services laws, which are the foundation of the so-called ‘passporting
rights’, allowing financial service companies regulated in one EU member state to offer their
products and services in other EU member states with no need for further authorization
(Ringe, 2018). Consequently, losing access to the European Single Market has been another
concern of London’s FinTech industry in light of Brexit, mentioned in 11.5% of the FN
articles under consideration. Brexit is seen as leading to higher transaction costs, predom-
inantly in the form of non-tariff barriers, such as changing standards, certifications and
regulations: ‘You have to start from the premise that . . .we are out of the single market-
. . . that means that many businesses in the UK that trade into the EU are using passporting
that’s not going to exist’ (S5, page 1, rows 31–37). However, the effect of the loss of
passporting depends on the market focus, the organizational structure and the specific
products and services a company provides. In this regard, FinTech companies that focus
solely on the UK market or feature a multi-domestic organizational structure seem to be less
affected: ‘We are a global company that is acting very locally . . .we see this as a benefit’ (C8,
page 2, rows 15–16). The same applies to FinTech companies with a strong focus on tech-
nology: ‘For the services I’m going to provide in the future, I don’t really feel that it’s going
to have an impact’ (C4, page 3, rows 20–21).
The extent to which most FinTech services are passported is seen as overstated by some
of the interviewees: ‘If you are a B2C FinTech or a B2microB FinTech, there’s not that
much that is passportable. Our key regulator authorisation is consumer credit, which is not
passportable . . .The only regulatory position that we rely on and is passported, is the PSP2
open banking license’ (C7, page 5, rows 25–39). In contrast, FinTech companies that offer
passportable financial services and want to continue offering them in the European Single
Market are indeed affected by the potential loss of the passporting rights: ‘If you were
talking to capital markets FinTechs . . . you may get a different answer’ (C7, page 5, rows
30–31); ‘With the passport it meant you could really start to play in a big market. Losing it is
a massive downside’ (C5, page 4, rows 3–4). These results highlight the significance of access
to the European Single Market, and the associated low transaction costs. Links facilitated
by this access are likely to be weakened by institutional changes associated with Brexit. Our
findings also indicate that a company’s exposure to these changes depends on their market
focus, organizational structure and the level of integration in highly regulated value chains.
When it comes to the domain of policy and support, London’s FinTech ecosystem has
benefited from a supportive government that meets the needs of the industry by providing a
flexible regulatory environment (e.g. the FCA Regulatory Sandbox) and tax incentives, and
by initiating collaboration initiatives such as the FinTech Delivery Panel of HM Treasury,
and the FinTech accelerator of the Bank of England: ‘There’s lots of support for start-up
businesses here in all the aspects of building a company’ (C5, page 2, rows 7–8); ‘I think
what is very strong in the UK is that they are a front-runner in terms of adjusting
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regulations to FinTech companies’ (C8, page 4, rows 11–12). This confirms the important
role of government in facilitating collaboration in EEs (Graça and Camarinha-Matos,
2017).
In addition, the UK government is seen as being very responsive when being approached
by high-growth FinTechs: ‘If a certain bit of regulation or policy doesn’t work for
FinTechs . . . they actually listen and are open to potentially change’ (C9, page 2, rows 30–
31); ‘They are very responsive and an invitation is usually immediately granted’ (C8, page 6,
rows 13–14). Some high-growth FinTechs are consulted by the government concerning
possible impacts of Brexit: ‘We were invited to a round table at the London Stock
Exchange . . . this one was specifically about Brexit . . . there was one person from the
Trade Department, one from the Treasury, and other ministers’ (C7, page 5, rows 11–14).
Start-ups, in contrast, face higher barriers: ‘If you’re a really small player in the market,
there is no optimal way’ (C7, page 8, row 10).
These findings illustrate the importance of direct ties with government representatives in
times of political uncertainty and institutional change. A company’s size/age may not only
determine its ability to establish and capitalize on direct ties with government representa-
tives, but it may also enable larger/established companies to further strengthen such ties in
times of political uncertainty and institutional change. As having strong ties with govern-
ment representatives increases access to information and a company’s political influence
(Mason and Brown, 2014), this suggests a positive relationship between a company’s size/
age and its ability to cope with political uncertainty and institutional change. While smaller
companies are less likely to establish and utilize direct ties with government representatives,
they can benefit from joining support organizations, such as Innovate Finance, which
provides ‘information flow, keeping you abreast of what is happening, and does certain
amount of lobbying’ (C9, page 2, rows 2–3) and is seen as ‘a really great organisation to be
part of to get introduced on different levers’ (C8, page 4, rows 32–33), as well as an authority
with impact, particularly when addressing generic topics such as Brexit. In addition,
London’s FinTech industry increasingly engages in collective lobbying together with the
financial services industry: ‘We are in the same sector, and we must speak with one voice’
(S4, page 3, rows 14–16). In this regard, industry events and All Party Parliamentary Groups
(APPG) are commonly used for exchanging views and forwarding collective opinions: ‘The
key one is the APPG of Fair Business Banking, we have already regular contact with them’
(C9, page 2, rows 13–14);’We are one of the initial members of an APPG for business
support and engagement’ (C8, page 4, row 12). These results illustrate that industry repre-
sentatives can act as brokers, closing structural holes between otherwise disconnected actors
in the ecosystem (Mason and Brown, 2014). This process does not only connect start-ups
with government representatives through indirect ties, but also creates direct ties among
start-ups that attend the same lobbying events, potentially fostering the exchange of new
ideas and knowledge. As such, political uncertainty may foster the creation of new direct ties
among start-ups, potentially increasing the connectivity of the ecosystem.
Location decisions of entrepreneurial actors
Despite uncertainties regarding Brexit, no significant decline in the UK’s tech start-up rate
has been observed since the EU referendum: ‘It seems as busy. I haven’t noticed any change,
positive or negative’ (C6, page 4, row 11). The persistent ability of London’s FinTech eco-
system to attract nascent entrepreneurs is seen as being strongly linked to the benefits of
agglomeration effect: ‘You have really good infrastructure, you have a big network of
support’(C6, page 1, rows 39–40), as well as to London’s strong global reputation: ‘When
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it comes to London, it’s a brand name. If you’re successful in London, you can be successful
everywhere. That’s why you start here’ (C4, page 2, rows 21–23). In fact, three of our
interview partners founded their companies after the EU referendum: ‘We were building
this company from the beginning in the heart of Brexit’ (C6, page 3, rows 31–32). In addi-
tion, some fast-growing European FinTech start-ups still plan to open offices in London to
expand their businesses: ‘If you are a serious FinTech somewhere else in Europe, you would
be moving to London at some point’ (C7, page 4, rows 15–16); ‘We decided to launch the
UK office after the referendum’ (C8, page 2, rows 17–18); ‘We are pretty sure that we are
coming. We started thinking about it even after Brexit’ (C2, page 2, rows 1–2). In contrast,
when focusing on the ability to attract fast-growing US and Asian FinTechs that seek to
expand into the European Single Market, London’s leading role might be challenged to a
certain degree. The Chinese FinTech company Ping Pong, as well as the Japanese FinTech
company Rakuten, which set up their European branches in Luxembourg instead of
London, can be seen as first examples of this trend.
At the time of writing, several established FinTech companies, such as TransferWise, WB21,
Azimo, PPRO and WorldRemit, have not only put in place firm Brexit contingency plans, but
have already started executing them. Our empirical results confirm this observation, as, in fact,
three of the interviewed FinTech companies have already established a licence in the EU in
order to open an office: ‘Given that we are expanding across Europe. . ., we’ll have to find a
way to open an office in Amsterdam’ (C7, page 4, rows 33–37); ‘We may have to do some
emergency legal arrangements’ (C9, page 5, row 22); ‘We have already established a Belgium
licence . . .And the reason for that has pretty much to do with continuity post-Brexit’ (C5, page
1, rows 15–18). As these FinTech companies want to maintain access to the UK market, their
relocation plans do not involve a full relocation to the EU. Rather, they plan to start subsidiar-
ies in the EU for the sake of market access: ‘When we are talking about relocation, it’s not so
much that the company is relocating, it’s more that they are setting up satellites’ (B1, page 5,
rows 18–20). What these companies have in common is that they provide ‘passportable’ finan-
cial services. As such, their behaviour can be explained by their integration in highly regulated
value chains. Moreover, their behaviour is linked to their dependency on the infrastructure of
established banks, which allow them to deliver their services: ‘At the front . . . you are engaged
with the FinTech company, but what happens behind the scenes is that the company still needs
to be engaged with a traditional corporate bank to have the banking infrastructure behind
them that allows them to operate’ (B1, page 1, rows 32–38).
Following the order of the Bank of England in 2017, established banks had to develop
contingency plans for different Brexit scenarios. During this process, some of them devel-
oped concrete plans concerning the relocation of specific business functions (e.g. euro-
clearing) to the EU. With the Brexit deadline approaching and uncertainty remaining
high, some of the banks in question decided to execute their relocation plans independently
of the UK–EU negotiation outcome: ‘We process . . . euro-clearance . . . and it’s moving . . . to
a location in Europe . . . even if Brexit got cancelled . . . that decision has been made’ (B1,
page 1, rows 5–15). This has led to a situation in which FinTech companies that want to
continue working with these banks also need to obtain regulatory authorization in the EU:
‘They will also have to change if they want to continue having their euro-clearance with us’
(B1, page 2, row 35). These findings confirm previous work of Svensson et al., (2019)
highlighting the relational dependency of parts of the FinTech industry on alliances with
financial incumbents who meet their needs for market legitimacy by allowing them to use
their banking licences and infrastructure. Therefore, financial incumbents can be seen as
brokers (Morrison, 2008), allowing start-ups to access a wider customer base. However, our
results also indicate that having strong ties with financial incumbents can reduce the variety
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of strategic options FinTech start-ups can resort to, as they are forced to comply with
strategic changes of incumbents or to dissolve the tie. This corroborates previous work of
Johns (2016) that highlights that strongly connected anchor firms play an important role in
firms’ egocentric networks and have the power to shape the strategic responses of entrepre-
neurial actors. Consequently, strongly connected anchor firms have the potential to change
the structure of EEs (D€orry, 2017).
Established FinTech companies see establishing a licence in the EU as relatively easy,
particularly if they already have authorization in the UK and experience operating in the
EU: ‘I think that Brexit will, for incumbent companies that are already operating [in the
EU] . . . just be a pain and they would get over it’ (C5, page 3, rows 38–41); ‘there is actually
no hurdle of getting a license, if you have one in the UK’ (C9, page 6, row 13); ‘we could solve
it with two or three people working for six months and a few tens of thousands of legal
fees . . . it is not existential’ (C7, page 6, rows 9–12). Although it is seen as unlikely that divest-
ment and relocation of whole companies will occur on a large scale, some companies expect
that Brexit will lead to changes in their strategic expansion, favouring locations outside of the
UK: ‘The question is about strategic expansion’ (I1, page 4, row 24); ‘Once there is a base in
Continental Europe there will be a higher likelihood that Europe will be served from that base.
Not just some licensing point of view, but also from sales and customer service and so on’ (C5,
page 3, rows 20–22). In contrast, nascent entrepreneurs and young start-ups with limited
resources are assumed to face bigger hurdles when seeking a European licence: ‘I think for
businesses that are yet to start it will be a barrier, because . . . this is an extra hurdle to have to
get another licence and another set of banking relationships’ (C5, page 3, rows 38–41; page 4,
rows 1–3); ‘If you’re very early FinTech, so you have very limited resources, it probably would
delay internationalisation’ (C9, page 6, rows 24–25). Many of these smaller companies have to
follow a wait-and-see approach: ‘Many haven’t really changed yet. They are waiting to get a
clearance on what is going to happen’ (S1, page 4, rows 13–14). However, they have developed
contingency plans that can be executed depending on the final negotiation outcome: ‘They do
scenario planning and at one point they will execute’ (S2, page 7, rows 28–31).
As start-ups typically start from a small size, they may be relatively easy to relocate to
other places in case Brexit leads to shrinking business opportunities: ‘The team is going to be
quite small at the beginning . . . and so it would be easy to go maybe to Paris or to Madrid or
Frankfurt or whatever’ (C2, page 2, rows 1–2). These results confirm findings by Stam
(2007) highlighting that a company’s size/age affects its relocation decisions. Established
companies seem more able to maintain access to the European Single Market while remain-
ing in the UK. In contrast, poorly equipped start-ups will either have to give up on their
links to the European Single Market, with potential negative consequences for their growth
prospects, or leave the UK altogether. In line with Clark and Wrigley (1997), who discussed
the effect of sunk costs on firms’ market-exit decisions, companies that have not yet accu-
mulated high sunk costs may be more able to leave the UK market.
Overall, our results highlight that, at the time of writing, London’s ability to attract
entrepreneurial actors from outside the EE has not decreased significantly. Moreover,
London has been able to prevent significant loss of entrepreneurial actors through reloca-
tion. However, the final negotiation outcome at the end of the transition period is likely to
affect this ability.
Conclusions and implications
The goal of this paper was to contribute to the debates regarding the resilience of EEs in
times of political uncertainty and institutional change. In doing so, we wanted to address
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some shortcomings that Alvedalen and Boschma (2017) identified in the EE literature,
including a lack of focus on the importance of, and connections between, different entre-
preneurial actors and the evolution of these connections in times of institutional change. In
addition, we aimed at putting a stronger emphasis on concepts discussed in the social net-
work literature (Stuart and Sorenson, 2005), such as egocentric networks, the relative impor-
tance of non-local versus local linkages and certain network features, such as diversity and
connectivity.
First, our results confirm that the six dimensions of Isenhard’s Entrepreneurial
Ecosystem Model (2011) are useful as a heuristic to identify and engage with strategic
responses of entrepreneurial actors and anchor firms embedded in EEs to uncertainty and
institutional change.
Second, they complement previous research (Clark and Wrigley, 1997; D€orry, 2017; Hill
et al., 2019; Johns, 2016; Stam, 2007; Svensson et al., 2019) and address the call of Alvedalen
and Boschma (2017) by illustrating that not all types of entrepreneurial actors respond to
political uncertainty and institutional change in the same way. Rather, their strategic
responses are influenced by their exposure to and capacity to cope with political uncertain-
ties and potential institutional changes, which vary with regards to their business character-
istics and egocentric network structures (Stuart and Sorenson, 2005). Our findings suggest
that the exposure to Brexit is greater for companies whose egocentric networks show strong
dependencies on non-local ties with the European Single Market (consumers, investment
and labour). In addition, our results suggest that the exposure to Brexit is greater for com-
panies that are integrated into highly regulated international value chains, such as FinTechs
that offer passportable financial products and services. In line with D€orry (2017), our results
also suggest that exposure to Brexit is greater for companies that have strong ties with
financial incumbents. Therefore, our results confirm that anchor firms play an important
role in firms’ egocentric networks (Johns, 2016; Svensson et al., 2019). Companies with high
exposure to Brexit are likely to feel the need to strategically respond to the associated
uncertainty. Such actor-level responses cover a variety of coping strategies, including put-
ting increased emphasis on attracting and retaining talent, searching for alternative funding
sources, intensifying lobbying activities, and relocating business functions. Our results show
that the capacity to execute such coping strategies is strongly affected by a company’s age
and size (Stam, 2007), disadvantaging start-ups in comparison to high-growth and estab-
lished companies. In this regard, we show that the advantages of high-growth and estab-
lished companies can be explained by their better resource endowment, which increases their
ability to maintain local and non-local ties with key actors inside and outside the EE, such as
other local FinTechs, government representatives, international talent and international
VCs, allowing them to continue capitalizing on their egocentric networks.
Third, the evidence gathered in this paper confirms that anchor firms have the power to
shape the structure of EEs (Johns, 2016). Hence, our results point in the same direction as
D€orry (2017), suggesting that, in an extreme scenario, large-scale relocations of financial
incumbents out of London could trigger a domino effect of relocations among FinTech
firms.
Fourth, the paper addresses the call of Alvedalen and Boschma (2017) by illustrating that
political uncertainty and the prospect of institutional change have the potential to modify
the diversity and the local and non-local connectivity of an EE, potentially affecting its
resilience (Spigel and Harrison, 2017). Concerning the diversity of London’s EE, our results
highlight that, at the time of writing, the start-up rate in the UK remains high and several
FinTechs were launched after the EU referendum. Therefore, it seems that London’s ability
to attract entrepreneurial actors from outside the EE has not decreased significantly.
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Likewise, our results illustrate that, so far, London has been able to prevent the loss of
entrepreneurial actors through outmigration. This suggests that the diversity of London’s
EE has not decreased drastically since the EU referendum. Following Spigel and Harrison
(2017), this can be seen as reflecting the resilience of London’s EE. However, our results also
show that strategic responses of entrepreneurial actors concerning relocation decisions are
conditional on the final Brexit deal. Hence, we would suggest that the final negotiation
outcome at the end of the transition period has the potential to further affect the diversity
of London’s EE. With regards to the connectivity of London’s EE, our results suggest that
the political uncertainty associated with Brexit has weakened non-local ties with VCs, and
some vertical local ties between FinTech firms of different ages and venture types, which has
the potential to negatively affect the connectivity of London’s EE (Spigel and Harrison,
2017). In contrast, local ties between established FinTechs and government representatives
appear to have been strengthened since the EU referendum. In addition, we show that
entrepreneurial actors try to reduce uncertainty and strengthen their bargaining power by
establishing horizontal ties with their local competitors. Following Spigel and Harrison
(2017), these new ties have the potential to positively affect the connectivity and resilience
of London’s EE by fostering the exchange of opinions and knowledge between start-ups
(Gilsing et al., 2008). Overall, our results confirm the theoretical considerations of Martin
and Sunley (2007), highlighting that EEs are complex adaptive systems, in which micro
(actor)-level responses shape macro-level patterns of EEs, and vice versa, and, due to com-
plex interdependencies among actors, the very prospect of a fundamental institutional
change has the potential to change its structure and resilience.
However, it is important to stress the exploratory nature of our research as offering some
of the first and limited insights into the impacts of Brexit on London’s EE. This unique
research opportunity comes with significant challenges, particularly the limited availability
of data and fundamental uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of the UK–EU nego-
tiations. Further, we were only able to interview a limited number of actors relevant to the
industry and rely on their personal, subjective opinions. These opinions are not only shaped
by the environment of uncertainty, but also by the positionalities of the interviewees, such as
their political beliefs, as well as by the political agenda of specific industry associations.
Moreover, we must acknowledge that we did not interview potential/nascent entrepreneurs
directly. Rather, we rely on the assessment of start-ups and other actors in the EE, such as
bank representatives, angel investors and support organizations, when discussing the impact
of Brexit on potential/nascent entrepreneurship, assuming that, due to their close contact
with potential/nascent entrepreneurs, they could provide some insight.
While qualitative research is helpful to obtain first insights into ongoing processes,
quantitative research methods, such as surveys or experiments, could be used to test our
findings on a larger scale. Such research could focus in greater detail on how relocation
decisions are shaped by different company characteristics. For example, the role of egocen-
tric networks of companies could be further considered (Borgatti and Foster, 2003) to
analyse the impact of different ties among actors on their relocation decisions, particularly
focusing on the co-location between incumbents and FinTech start-ups. In addition, it
would be interesting to quantify whether the decision of the UK to leave the EU will
lead to temporary decentralization of the FinTech scene by focusing on the spatial distri-
bution of future start-up rates, particularly comparing the UK, the EU and the USA.
Moreover, panel analysis could be used to track companies over time in order to analyse
changes in their strategic responses. However, we should bear in mind that it will probably
take many years, if not decades, before we are able to fully understand how the decision of
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the UK to leave the EU has changed London’s EE. And even then, its net effects are likely
to be difficult to quantify.
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